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Financial dollarization (FD) has been increasingly seen as a concern due to its negative 
impact on crisis propensity and output volatility, shifting the center of the FD debate 
towards a more proactive dedollarization stance. While often neglected, lending from 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is an important source of FD in emerging 
economies, and as such a dimension that cannot be overlooked by any dedollarization 
strategy. This paper revisits old and new arguments in favor of IFI lending in the local 
currency, and argues that any such initiative should rely, at least at an early stage, on the 
demand from residents in search for stable returns in units of the local consumption 
basket, but reluctant to take on sovereign risk. Due to their superior enforcement 
capacity, IFIs can intermediate these savings, currently invested in dollarized foreign 
assets, back into the local economy by offering investment grade local currency bonds 
and using the proceeds to dedollarize their own lending to non-investment grade 
countries, thereby contributing to reduce FD while fostering the development of local 
currency markets. 
                                                 
1 The author wants to thank Eduardo Fernández Arias and Esteban Molfino for fruitful discussions and 




Financial dollarization (FD) has been placed increasingly at the forefront of the policy 
debate in many emerging economies, driven by concerns about the currency imbalance 
and the associated financial fragility that it introduces for the economy as a whole.
2 As a 
result, the center of the FD debate has moved from a generally passive stance aimed at 
minimizing its negative implications, to a more proactive one oriented to offset the 
incentives that favor dollarization while developing local currency substitutes.
3  
 
While the debate has tended to center on the propensity to save in a foreign currency 
and the limitations to borrow internationally in the local currency, one of the most 
important sources of FD in emerging economies is their dependence on lending from 
international financial institutions (IFIs), which has been historically denominated in a 
basket of hard currencies. It follows that any dedollarization strategy should in principle 
encompass the particular issue of the denomination of multilateral lending, not only due 
to its implications regarding the country’s overall currency mismatch but also as a 
potential ingredient conducive to the development of a market for local currency 
securities of long duration. Indeed, the convenience of dedollarizing part of the lending 
granted by IFIs has already been highlighted in recent proposals (see, e.g., Eichengreen 
and Hausmann, 2002). However, for a number of reasons, these ideas have been received 
with skepticism or indifference by market practitioners and IFI staff. 
 
The present paper redresses this issue, by identifying and discussing old and new 
theoretical and practical arguments in favor and against IFI lending in local currency. In 
particular, and in contrast with the existing proposals that stress the potential demand 
from non-residents seeking a currency-diversified portfolio, this paper argues that any 
                                                 
2 In what follows, following what has become standard in the dollarization literature, “dollar” and “foreign 
currency”, and “peso” and “local currency” are used interchangeably. 
3 In this context, dedollarization is understood as a voluntary process, as opposed to a compulsory currency 
conversion. For an overview of the financial dollarization and dedollarization debates, see the papers 
presented in the IADB/World Bank Conference on Financial Dedollarization: Policy Options, December 1-
2, 2003, at http://www.iadb.org/ros/DeDolarizacion/Agenda.htm.    3
such initiative should (and realistically can) rely, at least at an early stage, on the demand 
from emerging market residents in search for local currency assets that minimize the 
volatility of returns measured in the local consumption basket, but reluctant to take on 
sovereign risk. In line with this view, the paper suggests a more limited approach to 
dedollarizing multilateral lending that may overcome some of the obstacles inhibiting 
their practical implementation while serving as a first step towards the more ambitious 
initiatives already on the table. 
 
Saving in the local currency faces two fundamental obstacles in developing countries: 
high nominal volatility (that is, unpredictable inflation due to nominal shocks or, most 
notably, to attempts to dilute the real value of local currency liabilities through inflation), 
and high credit risk (that is, a high probability of default, including through the violation 
of the terms and conditions of both public and private contracts under local jurisdiction, 
or the imposition of confiscatory taxes on the stock of savings).  
 
The first obstacle can be largely mitigated through the use of indexation, typically to 
the CPI, which limits the incentives for debt dilution. The second obstacle is more 
difficult to tackle. Country risk encompasses not only the possibility of outright default 
by a particular debtor but also a number of sovereign actions that negatively affect 
creditor rights. Both the index and the terms and conditions of contracts can suffer 
unexpected and undesired modifications, such as an involuntary currency conversion or 
debt restructuring, due to the intervention of local institutions.  
 
These risks, in turn, generate incentives to relocate savings in countries where 
property rights are better defined and protected. Thus, even in the absence of nominal 
instability (or despite the mitigating presence of indexation), residents may end up 
dollarizing their savings simply because of the lack of local currency assets free from 
country-specific credit risk. Under these conditions, there is a potential demand of 
investment-grade securities in local currency that cannot be satisfied by non-investment 
grade countries.  
   4
As a large part of the domestic pool of savings moves abroad as a result, the country 
is forced to rely on foreign (and, in particular, multilateral) credit.
4 IFIs can in practice 
make up (at least partially) for the lack of domestic funds due to their greater ability to 
enforce the contractual terms where private creditors fail, which enables them to collect 
funds and issue loans at close to risk-free rates to countries facing high country risk 
premiums. Thus, by means of their preferred creditor status, they are able to mitigate the 




In this light, the IFIs are natural candidates to launch the investment-grade local 
currency market. By issuing debt in emerging market currencies to fund local currency 
loans to emerging countries, they could dedollarize an important portion of the country’s 
external liabilities (converting existing IFI loans into the local currency while keeping a 




The main deterrent to advance with this type of initiatives has been the untested 
conjecture that the representative international investor would not be attracted by local 
currency assets. However, the minimum liquidity needed to launch markets for 
investment-grade local currency securities can be obtained from a latent demand for these 
securities coming from the country’s residents. 
 
The FD literature has made, both analytically and empirically, a distinction between 
residents and non-residents as potential demanders of local currency assets. Analytically, 
                                                 
4 de la Torre and Schmukler (2003) discuss offshorization as a mechanisms to cope with country-specific 
risk. If offshorization could successfully protect from country risk, foreign borrowing could readily 
substitute for the decline in domestic funds. However, the extent to which offshore claims are less exposed 
to country-specific risk than onshore assets is not obvious, as witness the recent Argentine default.  
5 IFIs also benefit from the implicit guarantee provided by their member countries, although the incidence 
of these guarantees on the costs of their lending to emerging economies is difficult to assess in the absence 
of default episodes. 
6 Indeed, if we accept that financial dollarization is a source of financial fragility, the partial dedollarization 
of their lending would, at best, reduce their exposure to sovereign risk. Needless to say, this argument as 
well as much of the discussion below applies primarily to multilateral development banks, as opposed to 
institutions like the IMF that are not funded in the market.   5
instruments denominated in the local currency will look relatively more attractive to risk-
averse local savers (borrowers), as they mirror their stream of future consumption 
(income) more closely.
7 Empirically, there is evidence that shows that past debt 
dedollarization processes have been largely driven by a deepening of the domestic 
markets based on local demand.
8 
 
On the other hand, some observers have argued that, inasmuch as domestic currency 
mismatches tend to cancel out, the negative consequences of FD are specifically driven 
by the country’s foreign currency position vis à vis non-residents, which would cast 
doubt on the benefits of a strategy focused on resident demand.
9 However, the evidence 
indicates that currency mismatches between residents do not net out in the aggregate, and 
can be as harmful as external liabilities in terms of the aggregate real exchange rate 
exposure.
10 Moreover, as this paper will argue, targeting the stock of foreign assets held 
by residents (including local institutional investors) may lead to a substitution of local 
currency domestic debt for foreign currency external debt, reducing the measured 
aggregate position of the country.
11 
 
The case of pension funds is illuminating. By acquiring a credit risk-free asset 
denominated in CPI units, fund managers would fulfill their role by ensuring a stable 
stream of retirement benefits while avoiding the risk of confiscation. However, in order 
                                                 
7 This distinction was originally made by Thomas (1985) in a two-country setup and, more recently, in Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (2003).  
8 Bordo et al. (2002), analysing the evolution of debt denomination in four British Dominions (Canada, 
Australia, New Zealend and South Africa), highlight that “the onset of World War I essentially closed the 
London capital market, and the response was similar in all four Dominions. The gold convertibility of the 
domestic currency was suspended (and not resumed until 1925) and governments raised funds 
domestically, essentially creating a domestic bond market. Foreign capital (at least for sovereign debt) 
would never regain to the same extent.”  Similarly, Claessens et al. (2003) find that the dollarization ratio 
of (domestic plus external) government bonds is negatively related with the size of domestic financial 
markets. See also Martínez and Werner (2002), Herrera and Valdez (2003), and Caballero et al. (2003), for 
the development of local currency markets in Mexico, Chile and Australia, respectively. 
9 See, e.g., Eichengreen at el. (2003). 
10 For example, Berganza and García Herrero (2004) find that the incidence of balance sheet effects on 
country risk arising from domestic deposit dollarization are comparable to those related with external 
foreign currency debt. Levy-Yeyati (2004) and Levy-Yeyati et al (2004) report similar results for banking 
fragility and crisis propensity. 
11 The stock of foreign assets held by residents is typically ignored while computing the aggregate currency 
mismatch.   6
to diversify credit risk, pension funds typically invest a fraction of their portfolio in 
dollarized foreign assets. As a result, while the emerging country government borrows in 
dollars from IFIs, a share of residents´ retirement savings is invested abroad in dollarized 
investment grade paper (such as that issued by IFIs to fund their own lending). It is 
immediate to see how IFIs may intermediate these funds by selling to pension funds the 
bonds that finance the country loans, and how this intermediation could be done in CPI 
units to the benefit of both parties involved. 
 
This paper argues that this type of arrangement is a natural first step to dedollarize the 
external debt of developing countries. The advantages of the scheme are several. First, it 
partially dedollarizes the liabilities of the country, voluntarily and with no cost for the 
local investor (who acquires an risk-free asset in a unit of account that minimizes the 
relevant volatility of future returns) nor for the IFIs (which manage to keep a balanced 
currency position).
12 Second, it starts up an international market in local CPIs that can be 
used as a benchmark by domestic borrowers seeking to avoid the real exchange rate 
exposure characteristic of foreign currency borrowing at a reasonable cost. Third, it could 
eventually attract funds from non-residents willing to hold a speculative position in the 
local currency without assuming excessive risk or, when and if exotic currency markets 
develop, in search for currency diversification.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II, succinctly revisits the literature on FD, 
highlighting the relative importance of IFI lending vis à vis other sources of financial 
dedollarization. Section III extends the model in Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) to derive 
analytically the link between country risk, offshorization of residents´ savings and FD, 
and reports preliminary evidence in line with the analytic results. Section IV evaluates the 
menu of options already being provided by IFIs to reduce currency mismatches, reviews 
the arguments for and against previous proposals to dedollarize IFI lending, and 
elaborates on alternative ways to pursue this goal. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking, currency risk would still affect the financial income of the IFI. Arguably, this is a very 
minor risk cost that can be priced in the loan.   7
 
II.  Definitions, implications and measurement 
 
In this paper, financial dollarization simply denotes the holding by residents 
(including the public sector) of foreign currency-denominated financial assets and 
liabilities. The phenomenon, which have received quite a lot of attention in the 
literature,
13 has been increasingly seen as a source of concern for a number of reasons, 
most notably the incidence of the associated currency mismatch on output volatility and 
financial fragility.  
 
These concerns have been validated by recent empirical work. Berganza et al. (2003) 
find that the response of sovereign spreads to exchange rate changes increases with the 
degree of external FD, while Berganza and García Herrero (2004) show that this effect is 
driven largely by exchange rate depreciations (in line with the balance sheet view) both 
when dollarization is external (measured as external obligations over GDP) or domestic 
(proxied by the ratio of dollarized onshore deposits over GDP). In turn, Domac and 
Martínez Pería (2000) find the foreign-liabilities-to-assets ratio of local banks to be 
positively correlated with the probability of a systemic banking crisis. Along this lines, 
Levy Yeyati (2004) finds that the propensity to face a banking crisis after a depreciation 
of the local currency increases with the degree of FD of domestic banking institutions. 
Finally, the evidence suggests that FD also has important consequences for the real 
economy, through its association with a higher propensity to suffer sharp capital account 
reversals or “sudden stops” (Calvo et al., 2004) and slower and more volatile growth rates 
(Levy Yeyati, 2004). 
 
The definition and measurement of FD in its different varieties is still subject to 
discussion (see Eichengreen et al. (2003) and Goldstein (2003)). While the literature has 
tended to emphasize the country’s foreign currency position vis a vis non-residents 
                                                 
13 Existing explanations of FD point at portfolio hedging considerations (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003), time 
inconsistency problems related to the temptation to dillute peso obligations through inflation (Calvo and 
Guidotti, 1989), the incidence of implicit debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001), currency-blind financial 
regulation (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2003) and signaling problems (De la Torre et al., 2003), among others. 
See De Nicoló et al. (2003) for a discussion and empirical testing of some of these hypotheses.    8
(typically measured by its foreign currency-denominated external debt),
14 the aggregation 
argument underlying this distinction (namely, that the currency exposure of resident 
creditors and debtors should cancel out) ignores important aggregate effects. Even if a 
financially dollarized economy is currency-balanced as a whole, it will likely be 
imbalanced at a micro level, leading to capital flight, bank runs and massive bankruptcies 
at the time of a real exchange rate adjustment, with important real consequences. Hence, 
the significant effects of domestic FD found in the literature. 
 
Moreover, a simple portfolio approach (as the one adopted in the next section) 
suggests that the degree of domestic and external dollarization should be intimately 
related. To the extent that the portfolio choice of resident savers determines the volume 
of peso loanable funds in domestic markets, it will be correlated with the dependence on 
dollarized foreign borrowing. 
 
With this in mind, in this paper I look at both domestic and external sources of FD. 
Domestic dollarization is captured by onshore dollar deposits, which, given the standard 
prudential limits on banks’ net currency position, provide a good proxy for the volume of 
onshore dollar loans. External dollarization, in turn, is represented by private external 
loans and holdings of external bonded debt, and by multilateral lending, within which I 
distinguish IMF and non-IMF loans.
15 Liability dollarization, in turn, is computed as the 
ratio between total foreign currency liabilities (where onshore dollar loans are proxied by 
onshore dollar deposits) over total liabilities (where, for consistency, onshore loans are 
proxied by onshore deposits). 
 
Table 1 provides a first glance at these different categories. For comparison, the table 
includes emerging countries for which data on all categories are available (and excludes 
offshore centers where FD is likely to be driven by factors of a different nature). Two 
things are worth noting in the table. First, the degree of exposure have remained 
                                                 
14 This focus on external debt implicitely presumes a link between bondholders´ residence and debt 
jurisdiction that is, at best, imperfect. 
15 The latter distinction is important. As already noted, the approach to IFI participation in the 
dedollarization effort discussed in this paper does not apply to an institution like the IMF that is not funded 
in the market.   9
relatively stable in recent years. Second, the median exposure to non-IMF IFI lending, 
which has increased slightly, exhibits levels comparable to that of external loans and is 
higher than that associated with domestic dollarization and external bonded debt (the 
focus of much of the empirical FD literature). Based on median values, it accounts for 
more that one fourth of total external dollarization and one fifth of total dollarization. 
These numbers by themselves indicate that a strategy aimed at reducing FD cannot ignore 
the role of IFIs. 
 
 
III. Offshorization and financial dollarization 
 
One aspect of the FD debate often overlooked by the literature is the interaction 
between country risk and the degree dollarization for non-investment grade economies. 
Trivially, if country risk drives domestic savings abroad where no local currency assets 
are available, higher country risk would be, other things equal, associated with higher 
total dollarization ratios (inclusive of offshore deposits), leading to a smaller volume of 
peso loanable funds. In turn, this deficit would be partially compensated by a greater 
dependence on foreign dollar borrowing (to the extent that it insulates investors from 
country risk better than domestic assets) and, ultimately, on IFI lending. This section 
presents a stylized analytical example to illustrate this intuition, and tests its empirical 
implications in the data. 
 
a.  An analytical example 
 
The link between country risk, offshorization and dollarization can be illustrated by a 
simple example that extends portfolio approach used in Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003). 
 
Consider the following scenario. A continuum of measure S of risk-averse resident 
investors endowed with a unit of cash, can invest in four alternative assets: peso and 
dollar debt issued in a non-investment grade emerging economy (the home economy) and 
peso and dollar debt issued in an investment grade developed economy (the foreign   10
economy). Denoting the portfolio shares by 
F x , 
H x , 
CF x , and 
CH x , where the 
superscripts F, H, CF and CH refer to dollar and peso assets in the home and the foreign 
economies, respectively, the real returns on each asset as measured by the resident 
investor would be given by: 
 
H H
c r= E ( ) r π µ µ − −  (1) 
FF
s c =E ( ) + rr µ µ −  
CF CF
s =E ( ) + rr µ  
CH CH =E ( ) rr π µ −  
where and  π µ ,  s µ  and  c µ  are zero-mean disturbances to the local inflation rate, the real 
(peso-dollar) exchange rate, and the home country’s sovereign risk, assumed to be 
distributed with variance-covariance matrix [] xy S , with  0 cs c SS π = = .
16 In turn,  ( )
j Er  
denotes the expected real return on the assets. 
 
On the other hand, a continuum of measure L of risk-neutral local borrowers have 
access to a production technology with known unit real returns (which, for simplicity, I 
assume that exceed unit borrowing costs) that can be financed from three sources: 
domestic peso and dollar debt, and foreign borrowing (whose share in the liability 
portfolio is denoted by x
C). The first two instruments are identical to those available to 
investors. Offshore lending, on the other hand, can be interpreted at least in two ways: as 
foreign lending by private investors (under the assumption that offshorization indeed 
provides limited protection from country-specific risk), or by IFIs (under the assumption 
that the preferred creditor status eliminates default risk). For the moment, it suffices to 
assume that the access to this source entails an additional unit cost  () X φ , with   
()0 X φ′ > , where X = x
CL.
17  
                                                 
16 The qualitative results are not driven by these simplifying assumptions. In Appendix II, I present the 
solution for the case in which country and real exchange rate risk are not independent. 
17 If the source is private foreign investment, these costs would capture the fact that foreign contracts, while 
perceived as providing better protection from confiscation risk than domestic contracts, are still subject to 
sovereign default. Alternatively, if the source is IFI lending, the costs may reflect the upward sloping 
cherge scale typically applied to non-concessional multilateral loans, as well as costs associated with the 
process of requesting the loan and complying with the attached conditionalities.    11
Then, interest rate arbitrage implies that  
  E (r
H) = E (r
F) = E(r
C) + φ,    
Assume further that investors maximize risk-adjusted real return measured in units of 
the local consumption basket: 




UE r V a r r =−  (2) 
where 
0
j x ≥ , 
jj
j
rx r =∑  
It can be shown (see Appendix II) that any solution to the portfolio problem can be 
characterized by the following dollarization and offshorization ratios: 
 
1 FC F F H
u x x= E ( r ) r
cV





CF CH CF F
cc
x x= E ( r) r
cS
γ ≡+ − −  (4) 
where 









=  (6) 
is the dollarization share in the absence of real return differentials (henceforth, the 
underlying dollarization ratio). Note that, in this simplified setup where domestic interest 
rate differentials are ruled out by arbitrage, λ = λu. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) characterize a continuum of portfolios that maximize the 
investors´ utility. While the availability of offshore peso assets has no incidence on the 
dollarization ratio if γ  < λυ , it does so in the case in which γ  ≥ λυ , where the excess of 
offshore assets over the desired dollar assets can only be held in pesos (that is x
CH ≥ γ -   12
λυ ,). Therefore, if offshore peso assets were not available, dollarization would be driven 
entirely by offshorization, as the latter could never be below the dollarization ratio. 
 
More generally, it can be shown that, if the optimal offshorization ratio exceeds the 
desired dollarization ratio, in the absence of country risk-free peso assets, the new 
dollarization ratio (identified by the lower bar) is given by (see Appendix II): 
  () ( ) u
CF H
cc cc
cc s r r E
S V c S V
S S S
λ λ γ γ








The intuition is straightforward: if peso assets are not available abroad, capital flight 
translates directly into an increase in the dollarization ratio.
18 The difference u λ λ − , 
which is increasing in country risk, is solely due to the absence of a country risk-free 
asset in the local currency.  
 
The previous analysis can be readily extended to the case of CPI-indexed domestic 
assets, as perfect indexation could be expressed, in terms of this example, as µπ = 0. 
Therefore, if domestic peso assets are indexed to the local CPI, the dollarization ratio 





, and would be entirely driven by country risk. In 
other words, country risk sets a floor to the extent to which a non-investment grade 
country can reduce FD either through monetary policy (reducing inflation volatility and 
the exchange rate pass-through) or through CPI indexation. 
 
How does the offshorization of domestic savings impact on the currency composition 
of resident liabilities? To answer this question, first note that the domestic balance of 
funds requires that 
 (1 ) (1 ) Lx S γ − =−    (8) 
and, for the peso market,    
 (1 ) (1 )
B LS λ λ −= −  (9) 
where λ
B denotes the borrower’s dollarization ratio. 
                                                 
18 Note that this is also the dollarization ratio that would obtain should local dollar deposits be banned, 
leaving offshorization as the only option to dollarize savings.   13
 
If offshorization were not binding, an increase in country risk would not alter the 
amount of available peso funds, and the resulting decline of domestic funds would be 




However, when the offshorization ratio is binding, the supply of peso funds is 
automatically determined by the offshorization ratio as, from  (8) and (9), we obtain: 
 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
B LS L x λγ − =− = − (10) 
or 
B x λ = . In this case, the borrower has effectively two options: domestic peso loans 
(limited by the domestic supply of funds) and dollarized foreign borrowing. As country 
risk mounts, the cost of the former relative to the latter increases, raising the liability 
dollarization ratio (which is now due entirely to foreign borrowing). The associated 
increase in peso interest rates offsets 
H r , on the other hand, partially offsets the 




It is immediate to see that the presence of country-risk free offshore assets restores 
(9), as the borrower can now meet his financing needs by borrowing pesos abroad (at the 
peso risk-free rate plus the transaction cost φ ), decoupling the choice of currency and 
location. In particular, increases in x as a result of higher country risk need no longer 
have an impact on λ
B. 
 
In sum, high country risk is associated with a high offshorization ratio and, if the 
latter is sufficiently large, with a smaller supply of peso loanable funds. In turn, to the 
extent that foreign borrowing is relatively immune to country risk, higher country risk 
would lead to a larger share of foreign borrowing and, in the absence of risk-free peso 
assets, higher dollarization ratios. 
                                                 
19 In the more general case of diminishing marginal returns to investment, to the extent that the demand for 
loans respond to the higher financing costs due to the increase in country risk, the decline in total 
borrowing could weaken the demand for peso loans and put downward pressure on the peso-dollar 
differential, increasing asset dollarization λ while and reducing liability dollarization λ
B. 
20 It can be readily seen that λ
Β = 1 – (1 – γ) (S/L), so that ∂γ/∂Scc > 0 implies that ∂λ
Β/∂Scc > 0.   14
 
Are non-residents different? 
 
An argument repeatedly made in the literature stresses that hedging considerations 
indicate that resident investors are likely to exhibit smaller dollarization ratios than non-
resident investors.
21 The previous example helps illustrate the point. 
 
First, note that, using µs ≈ µe - µπ , where  e µ  denotes nominal exchange rate shocks, 







π λ =  (11) 
the coefficient of a simple regression of the inflation rate on the nominal exchange rate, 
that is, a crude measure of the exchange rate pass through. 
 
Starting from (11), and exploiting the symmetry of this setup, it is easy to verify that, 
in a stylized two-country world, the degree of underlying “pesification” (that is, the share 









π λ =  (12) 
where 
* e denotes the dollar-peso exchange rate, and 
* π the rate of inflation in the foreign 
country.  
 
It follows that the underlying demand for peso assets from residents and non-residents 
is highly asymmetric. On the one hand, non-resident demand for assets denominated in 
emerging currencies is proportional to the pass-through coefficient of changes in the 
exchange rate vis à vis the emerging currency, which is unlikely to be statistically 
different from zero for developed economies (and for most emerging economies). On the 
other, for any pair of countries with comparable pass-through coefficients, any coefficient 
below 50% would imply that the demand for local currency assets from residents should 
                                                 
21 See Thomas (1985) for an early reference.   15
exceed that from non-residents. In both cases, the asymmetry deepens as inflation 
volatility (and the pass-through coefficient) in the emerging economy declines and, by 
extension, when the peso assets are indexed to the local inflation rate. 
 
This example certainly oversimplifies the portfolio choice of the representative 
resident and non-resident investors. In particular, it abstracts from cross-border 
transaction costs that in practice introduces a source of investor heterogeneity that helps 
explain the permanence of a captive pool of domestic dollar funds from small investors in 
the midst of a sovereign debt crisis. 
 
However, the exercise provides a valid intuition in relation to two points that are 
critically important to assess the role of IFIs in the development of a market for peso 
assets: i) the incidence that country risk may have (through the offshorization of domestic 
savings) in determining FD in non-investment grade countries; and ii) the fact that local 
currency assets are likely to look more appealing to resident investors than to foreigners, 
particularly in those countries where inflation is relatively stable. 
 
b.  Offshorization and dollarization in the data 
 
The previous analysis offers a number of empirical implications. First, in the absence 
of risk-free instruments in exotic currencies, non-investment grade countries may see a 
substantial portion of their domestic savings dollarized simply as a result of the flight of 
capital to safer investments abroad. In turn, this capital flight, inasmuch as it reduces the 
volume of domestic loanable funds, increases both financing costs and the country’s 
dependence on external borrowing, to the extent that the latter is perceived as less 
exposed to country-specific credit risk.  
 
Regarding the last point, some observers have argued that offshore assets (and, in 
particular, external debt) are free from government interference with the laws governing 
the financial contracts or, alternatively, with the local judiciary system in charge of   16
enforcing them.
22 From this perspective, as country risk increases, we should see the 
balance between domestic and external debt tilt towards the latter. However, while a 
foreign jurisdiction may certainly protect the debt holder from direct government acts, 
cases in which debt restructuring discriminates in favor of domestic assets are not 
unusual, as shown by the differential treatment typically assigned to domestic bank 
deposits during default episodes as well as recent cases of selective default.
23 
 
At any rate, inasmuch as offshorization remains only a partial protection towards 
country risk, one would expect that a more limited access to domestic finance would 
make non-investment grade countries more dependent on IFIs lending.
24 This section 
explores whether this intuition is consistent with the empirical evidence. 
 
To do that, I distinguish between onshore dollarization ratio (computed as onshore 
dollar deposits over total onshore deposits), and deposit dollarization (λu), computed as  
the share of dollar on total deposits including resident deposits abroad. The second 
variable, while less frequent in the literature, is nonetheless a more accurate measure of 
the degree of dollarization of residents’ portfolios as depicted in the analytical example, 
and the one that more clearly reflects the incidence of both underlying dollarization and 
offshorization, where the latter is measured as the ratio between offshore and total 
resident deposits. The onshore supply of loanable funds is proxied by the ratio of onshore 
deposits over GDP.
25 I look at two sources of external dollarization, namely, non-official 
(private) lending (which groups external loans and external bonded debt), and official 
lending (where I distinguish between IMF and non-IMF lending). Liability dollarization, 
in turn, is computed as the ratio between total foreign currency liabilities over total 
liabilities, where currency composition of onshore loans is proxied by that of onshore 
deposits. Finally, country risk is measured as the stripped spread of sovereign debt over 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., De la Torre and Schmukler (2003). 
23 The recent Argentina default is a clear example in which domestic creditors received a more benign 
treatment. 
24 Note that this does not refer to higher IMF assistance during crisis episodes, but rather to a more 
permanent dependence on lending from multilateral development banks. 
25 I chose onshore deposits instead of M2 or domestic credit to be consistent with the way the offshorization 
ratio is computed. However, all three variables are highly correlated and yield virtually identical results.   17
comparable US Treasuries, as captured in the EMBI Global Index compiled by J. P. 
Morgan. 
 
Table 2 provides a first glance at the links between country risk, the location and 
currency composition of resident savings, and the different sources of external 
dollarization, by looking at the correlation of their period averages.
26  
 
The first things to note from the table are the association of country risk with a 
smaller volume of onshore loanable funds and a greater offshorization ratio, on the one 
hand, and the high and positive correlation between the latter and total deposit 
dollarization (and, in turn, between deposit dollarization and country risk), on the other. 
Both findings are consistent with the implications of the previous model. 
 
Regarding the sources of external liability dollarization, the table reveals no clear link 
between country risk and non-official external finance, suggesting that, while offshore 
debt may provide some protection against country risk (hence, the weaker negative link 
between these two variables), it does not offset the decline in domestic funds. This 
decline is ultimately compensated by a larger dependence on IFI lending, as reflected in a 
larger ratio over GDP as well as in a larger IFI-to-total external credit ratio. 
 
These links are explored more in detail in Table 3. As the table shows, risky countries 
are associated with fewer onshore deposits (columns 1-3) and greater deposit 
offshorization (columns 4-6), even after controlling for onshore dollarization, and for the 
presence of restrictions on dollar deposits that may potentially bias residents towards 
offshore assets if capital flight were motivated by currency risk (interestingly, restrictions 
appear to be positively related with onshore deposits and negatively related with 
offshorization). 
 
                                                 
26 Averaging periods vary by country, as they correspond to those for which the country risk measure is 
available.   18
Thus, country risk appears to be an additional important determinant underlying a 
weak demand for peso assets in non-investment grade countries. However, unlike in the 
standard portfolio approach, in this case dollarization is simply a by-product of the lack 
of investment-grade peso assets. This is confirmed by the fact that deposit dollarization, 
even after controlling for country risk and underlying dollarization (computed from 
equation (6) based on monthly inflation and real exchange rate data), is still positively 
associated with the deposit offshorization ratio (columns 7 and 8). This result holds for 
the larger sample obtained by dropping the country risk index (column 9), and in a 
dynamic setting with country fixed effects (columns 10 and 11). 
 
Table 4, in turn, shows that the offshorization ratio is associated with greater IFI 
dependence. This positive link is verified both cross-section and over time, for either IMF 
or non-IMF official lending. This contrasts with the lack of a significant link with other 
sources of external credit reported in Table 5 (columns 1 and 2). Similarly, no link is 
found when total external long-term liabilities are used as a proxy for foreign currency 
external debt (columns 3 and 4).
27 Finally, the table shows how liability dollarization is 
positively correlated with deposit offshorization (columns 5-8), in line with a higher 
dependence on IFI lending. 
 
In sum, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that, in the absence of risk-free 
instruments in exotic currencies, non-investment grade countries may see a substantial 
portion of their domestic savings dollarized simply as a result of the flight of capital to 
safer investments abroad. In turn, this capital flight, inasmuch as it reduces the volume of 
domestic loanable funds, increases the country’s dependence on dollarized IFIs lending, 
shifting the currency liability composition towards the foreign currency as a consequence. 
 
 
                                                 
27 These data is available from the World Bank´s GDF for a larger sample and a longer period. The implicit 
assumption that all external debt issued by non-industrial countries is denominated in foreign currency 
seems to be a reasonable approximation.  
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IV. Financial dedollarization and the IFIs 
 
As the previous discussion highlights, IFIs tend to substitute domestic sources of 
finance in non-investment grade countries. Crucially, the role of IFIs in the context of a 
narrow domestic market does not necessarily entail, as sometimes argued, a significant 
subsidy to emerging economies. Indeed, recent work have revealed that the subsidy 
component in IMF non-concessional lending to emerging economies is virtually null 
(Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2001), as follows from the absence of default episodes in the 
past –a result that would also apply to other IFIs blessed with a similar preferred creditor 
status.  
 
Indeed, a key characteristic of IFIs is that, unlike private investors, and for reasons 
that exceed the scope of this paper, they exhibit a surprisingly good repayment record.
28  
Thus, at the risk of oversimplifying, one can think of IFIs as contributing to a “sovereign 
risk transformation.” Specifically, they can be seen as matching the supply of private 
funds in search of investment grade securities, and the demand of funds by non-
investment grade economies. By intermediating between the two, the IFIs exploit their 
superior enforcing capabilities to channel these funds into lending that, through their 
intervention, becomes virtually risk-free.  
 
It is only natural, then, to exploit this advantage to foster the supply of local currency 
funds that are lost due to sovereign risk considerations. This does not requires the 
extension of additional lending by the IFIs, but rather the issuance of investment grade 
paper to meet the demand for risk-free local currency securities, and the use of the 
proceeds to convert part of the outstanding stock of IFI loans so as to keep a balanced 
currency position. 
 
As noted in the introduction, while schemes along these lines have already been 
proposed and have been the subject of discussion by economists and IFI staff in recent 
                                                 
28 The reasons why IFIs can successfully enforce their preferred creditor status are certainly a fruitful 
research topic that exceeds the scope of this paper.    20
years, little, if any, progress has been made so far in that direction. This section reviews 
the existing facilities offered by IFIs to their clients to hedge their currency exposure, and 
the alternative proposals related to the dedollarization of external liabilities. In particular, 
it describes a scheme oriented to meet the demand for local-currency investment-grade 
securities by residents along the lines discussed in the previous section, addressing in the 
process the main criticism faced by old and new initiatives of this type.  
 
What’s in the menu? 
 
While the concerns related with currency mismatches has been increasingly 
acknowledged by IFIs, their supply of hedging instruments available is still rather 
limited. The World Bank (WB), for example, offers the option to convert outstanding 
loan obligations (or to request a swap of its foreign currency obligation) into local 
currency. Since WB loans are funded in the foreign currency, the transaction requires that 
the Bank arranges a local-foreign currency swap with a third financial institution to 
transfer the currency exposure.
29  
 
These local currency products are not without benefits, particularly for non-
investment grade clients that would be otherwise unable to access long-dated currency 
swaps directly in the capital markets. However, they are typically limited in volume, 
shorter than the loan they are intended to hedge, and granted on a case-by-case basis 
subject to the existence of a liquid swap market.
30  
 
More importantly, rather than expanding the pool of local currency funds, they tap on 
existing swap markets. Thus, while they are likely to benefit local borrowers through 
longer duration and reduced transaction (e.g., collateral) costs, they are also likely to 
                                                 
29 For details, see the brochure on Local Currency Financial Products posted on 
www.worldbank.org/fps/hedging.htm. Currency swaps are also offered by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). 
30 The emerging markets that, according  to the World Bank, satisfied this condition by end-2003 included 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Philipines, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. Of these, only Colombia, India, 
Indonesia and the Philipines are non-investment grade countries.   21
crowd out the available supply of hedging instruments. At any rate, and possibly because 
of their limited benefits, these relatively new products have not been in high demand.
31 
 
The WB have also launched a few issues in investment-grade exotic currencies.
32 The 
modality is not uniform. For example, the February 2000 3-year euronote in Mexican 
pesos was issued abroad and was largely placed among American investors, on the back 
of strong external demand shortly after rating agencies announced that they were 
considering an upgrade of the country’s debt to investment grade. On the other hand, the 
May 2000 Chilean CPI-indexed peso 5-year euronote was distributed mainly among 
domestic institutional investors, who purchase about 75% of the total issue. 
 
While these issues are not without positive spillovers for the development of local 
currency markets, their value added in the context of a dedollarization agenda is 
questionable, as the risk transformation role emphasized in this paper is bound to be less 
valuable for economies that already enjoy investment-grade status. By contrast, the 
analysis in the previous section suggests that the best use of the IFIs’ advantage entails 
external issues (to minimize the crowding out of available domestic funds) in non-
investment grade countries (unable to attract domestic investors in search of low-risk 
assets). 
 
A move in this direction was the March 2004 Colombian CPI-indexed bond, issued 
and placed domestically by the WB within domestic institutional investors. While it still 
has the potential to crowd out existing (captive) demand for peso assets, the bond was 
nonetheless welcome by the government as a way to satisfy the appetite for risk-free long 
assets in the local currency from the growing private pension system, which would 
otherwise have to be met by foreign assets.
33 Closer to the scheme proposed here was the 
May 11, 2004 eurobond in Brazilian reais issued by the Inter-American Development 
                                                 
31 As of April 2004, only three countries had sign the Master Derivatives Agreement required by the WB to 
request a currency swap. 
32 A list of recent World Bank issues can be found in 
http://www.worldbank.org/debtsecurities/recent_issues.htm.  
33 The same would apply to domestic issues in investment-grade Chile, where a sustained fiscal surplus 
leaves little room for the issuance of long-dated sovereign paper.   22




These issues certainly reflect a welcome shift in the funding strategies of some IFIs. 
However, contrary to what one would be led to believe, they have been entirely 
motivated by the search of lower funding costs. Indeed, rather than used to convert 
outstanding loans into the same exotic currencies, their proceeds have been immediately 
swapped into dollars. Thus, for all the merit that these efforts may have, their effective 
impact in terms of dedollarizing the liabilities of emerging economies has been virtually 
null. 
 
What has been proposed? 
 
Most of the discussion about the type of peso instrument best fit to substitute current 
dollar assets while maximizing its hedging potential has centered around CPI indexation, 
an avenue that proved to be successful in containing and undoing FD in Chile and Israel, 
particularly when it comes to longer financial contracts. The local CPI, the most obvious 
candidate index for domestic residents, has been confronted with several alternatives in 
the same spirit, particularly when targeting foreign investors.  
 
In general, indexation of dollar-denominated instruments to a price closely correlated 
with the debtor’s income could in principle attain what could be labeled synthetic 
dedollarization, decoupling the real cash flows of the asset (measured in units of the 
debtor’s income) from the evolution of the real exchange rate. While in practice these 
instruments may be more opaque for the average investor than a plain CPI-indexed local 
currency bond (and, in turn, more difficult to market), they may be free from moral 
hazard and thus potentially attractive for sophisticated investors. Crucial in this regard is 
the exogeneity of the index of choice.
35  
                                                 
34 This was just the second international issue in a Latin American currency by an IFI. The first one, in 
April 2004, was a global bond denominated in Mexican pesos. To my knowledege, no other multilateral 
development bank has issued debt in non-investment grade currencies. 
35 Indexation to a tax revenue index, for example, offers no such advantage.   23
 
Among the latter, two alternatives stand out: a GDP index, and a commodity index.
36 
Both are similar in nature, being equivalent to a plain vanilla bond plus a short position in 
the commodity or the issuing country’s GDP, and both are subject to the country’s 
sovereign risk. While commodities are more easily priced and hedged due to the 
existence of derivative markets, their use is bound to be limited to commodity exporters, 
and to the extent these exports correlate with the country’s income. Moreover, much in 
the same way as for the currency swap discussed above, it is not clear how such 
indexation improves upon a short hedge purchased directly by the issuer in the derivative 
markets (although access to these markets may be more costly for non-investment grade 
issuers). On the other hand, while GDP indexation may be more suitable to smooth out 
countercyclical variations in debt-to-GDP ratios and borrowing costs, it is difficult to see 
how GDP risk can be stripped and hedged by potential investors, particularly in the 
absence of a market for GDP indexes.
37  
 
The same caveats apply in principle to CPI-indexation as a way of luring foreign 
investors. Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002) stress the attractiveness of a basket of CPI-
indexed exotic currencies for non-residents. Moreover, they specifically propose that IFIs 
issue debt in these currencies to fund their own lending to emerging economies and 
provide the needed liquidity for the index. This requires matching not only the demand 
and supply of funds in each currency but also across currencies to allow for the needed 
diversification strategy. As such, it involves a non-trivial coordination effort. 
Furthermore, while speculative non-resident demand for specific currencies perceived as 
undervalued is not unlikely (as the IDB issue in Brazilian reais attests), interest from 
                                                 
36 See Borensztein and Mauro (2002) on GDP-indexed bonds, and Caballero and Panageas (2003) on 
copper-indexed debt for the case of Chile. 
37 To my knowledge, among emergng economies, only Bulgaria has issued a GDP-indexed bond (albeit 
with a call clause that eliminates the upside from indexation). The bond was originally placed among 
institutional investors and has hardly traded since. At the time of this writing, September 30, the Argentine 
government is considering the use of GDP indexation in its forthcoming debt exchange offer.    24




IFIs and the intermediation of resident savings 
 
Once we shift the focus away from international investors to target the demand from 
residents, the use of CPI indexation presents important advantages, including the fact that 
it can be measured at daily frequencies (improving the accuracy of the indexation) by an 
autonomous agency (ensuring that the index is free from government manipulation). 
More importantly, unlike other indexes, the CPI enjoys a demand arising from the 
hedging properties highlighted in the previous section. As such, it is a natural choice to 
jump start the dedollarization process with the help of an investment grade issuer (the 
IFIs) that decouples sovereign and currency risk, to attract domestic investors willing to 
invest in their own currency at a reasonable level of credit risk.
39 
 
Resorting directly to the domestic market, however, may have economic (and 
political) drawbacks, as it crowds out already available local-currency funds by inducing 
a shift from high-risk government and corporate domestic debt to investment-grade IFI 
paper. In that case, while the new issue may contribute to extend the market for local 
currency securities onshore by bringing in new investors previously reluctant to assume 
country risk, it is likely to increase the cost of funds domestically, inducing the 
government to borrow abroad, with only a minor change in the overall composition of 
government liabilities. Thus, in order to maximize the beneficial composition effect, the 
new debt should be issued in international markets, to cater investors the seek stable 
returns in units of the local consumption basket, but are reluctant to take on sovereign 
risk. 
 
                                                 
38 Interestingly, Borensztein and Mauro also highlight the appeal of GDP-indexed bonds for a diversified 
international investor. To their credit, emerging market debt as an asset class may have looked as distant 
prior to the Brady plan as GDP-indexed or CPI-indexed bonds look today. 
39 Risk decoupling is at the heart of the Eichengreen-Hausmann proposal. However, in that context, 
currency risk is tolerated to the extent that it can be diversifed away in a basket of exotic currencies. In the 
current version, by contrast, CPI indexation eliminates currency risk from the resident´s stanpoint, so that 
no currency diversification is required.   25
Both the literature and the recent experiences point at institutional investors as the 
natural target of the first issues. Consider, for example, the case of pension funds. The 
advantages of the CPI as the benchmark unit of account are apparent: By acquiring a 
credit risk-free asset denominated in units of the consumption basket, they fulfill their 
role as guarantors of a stable stream of income after retirement while avoiding country-
specific credit risk.
40 Indeed, pension funds are typically allowed to invest a fraction of 
their portfolio in investment-grade foreign assets (see Table 6), a fraction that has been 
growing, particularly since the Argentine debacle sounded the alarm on excessive 
exposure to sovereign risk. Thus, while the government borrows from IFIs, a share of 
residents´ retirement savings is being invested abroad in triple A paper such as that issued 
by IFIs to fund their loans. IFIs can readily channel these funds back into the domestic 
economy by selling to the pension funds CPI-indexed bonds to finance loans 
denominated in the same index.
41  
 
The demand for a long-dated investment-grade local-currency paper that may come 
from institutional investors, as well as resident savings abroad, may reach important 
levels, as shown in Table 7, which compares stocks of pension funds assets, resident 
deposits abroad, and outstanding IFI loans, for emerging economies that have recently 
privatized their social security system.
42 
 
As noted, a few successful IFI issues in exotics currencies already revealed the 
existence of a demand for these securities. In this context, the redollarization of their 
proceeds is particularly puzzling, and at odds with the concerns about FD repeatedly 
endorsed by IFI officials and publications. Given the already high exposure of these 
                                                 
40 Pension fund regulation should acknowledge this explicitely in order to align the incentives of pension 
fund managers along these lines. See Carriquiry and Gruss (2004) for a discussion of the case of Uruguay. 
41 An alternative approach that has been the subject of informal discussion among IFI staff is the use of IFI 
guarantees to local currency debt to reduce the credit risk of non-investment grade issues in exotic 
currencies. Halfway between a risk-free IFI bond and risky emerging market paper, this combination (if 
guarantees are capped in dollars) would entail for the IFIs similar risks as those associated with existing 
guarantees to dollar bonds.  
42 The previous analyses does not deny the existence of non-resident demand for exotic currencies. 
However, while anecdotal evidence indicates that this demand do exist, it is likely to be driven by short-
term speculative appreciation games rather than by the long-run diversified investors needed to build the 
market.   26
institutions with many of their clients, it is easy to see how the swap with a third financial 
institutions that followed the issuance of these bonds could have been done, alternatively, 
directly with the client, partially dedollarizing outstanding obligations. While the cash 
flows of the bond would typically be different from that of the loan, the swap markets 
provide sufficient flexibility to match both schedules with little, if any, additional 
transaction costs. On the other hand, the settlement currency of both streams of cash 
flows would be immaterial in this case. In particular, even if the currency of 
denomination of the original loan is preserved, his obligation would be indexed to the 
local currency (or the local CPI), eliminating any currency exposure –an argument also 
valid for new lending. Moreover, and for the same reason, there is no obvious rationale to 
limit the currency conversion to the local expenditure component of the loan (as is 
currently the case for existing local currency products). Indeed, an appropriate hedging 
strategy would need to match the currency composition of liabilities with that of future 
earnings (as opposed to past expenses). In sum, there seems to be no obvious obstacle to 
onlend the funds obtained from local currency issues to emerging market clients. 
 
Addressing the skeptics 
 
Besides the mixed reviews received by markets participants, the proposals to 
dedollarize IFI lending have faced criticism from within IFI circles. The present analysis 
would not be complete without a brief discussion of some of them.  
 
Rajan (2004) summarizes two of the main arguments. First, he points out that a 
portfolio approach to FD should take into account the correlation between financial 
returns and non-financial income. More precisely, to the extent that economic activity is 
negatively correlated the real exchange rate, local savers would demand lower returns on 
dollar assets that are used as a hedge against economic downturns. In principle, however,  
this preference should not induce FD, as local debtors would be willing to pay the higher 
returns demanded on peso assets to hedge their income stream.  
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The second argument is more relevant to our discussion: In the presence of myopic 
behavior, one would expect emerging market borrowers to exploit the lower dollar 
borrowing costs in good times, disregarding the contingent cost of the associated 
exposure –likely to be borne by others.
43 Note that, while the peso interest rate charged 
by IFIs would be below that demanded by private lenders (due to the lower credit risk), 
the conversion of outstanding IFI loans to the local currency would not save debtors the 
currency risk premium that induced dollarization in the first place. In other words, if FD 
were the result of asymmetric risk pricing, rather than lack of investment grade local 
currency assets as argued here, opportunistic debtors would turn down the offer to insure 
against future balance sheet effects at a fair price. If so, the proposed dedollarization 
strategy, rather than suffering from the lack of investor interest, may be condemned by 
the indifference of the very debtors that it is intended to relieve. 
 
This agency argument looks a bit overdone in light of recent dedollarization efforts in 
emerging economies.
44 Nonetheless, taking the argument at face value, one can only 
conclude that it would be in the interest of the IFIs to correct this imperfection by 
including dedollarization within the standard conditionality set, rather than offer 
misleadingly cheap dollar lending to perpetuate this perverse cycle. Ultimately, agency 
problems provide yet another reason for IFIs to adopt a more proactive stance. 
 
 
V. Final  remarks 
 
This paper tried to convey a simple message: to the extent that country risk induces 
financial dollarization through the offshorization of domestic savings –as the analysis and 
the evidence presented here seem to indicate–, IFIs can exploit their superior enforcement 
                                                 
43 Variations on this argument have been examined in the literature in relation to market imperfections such 
as implicit guarantees (Bumside at el., 2001), or currency-blind regulation (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2003) 
that are conducive to excessive dollarization. 
44 Examples include, among others, the gradual dedollarization of public debt in post-Tequila Mexico and, 
more recently, Brazil; the revision of the prudential framework as well as the introduction of CPI-indexed 
assets in Uruguay; and the imposition of quantitative restrictions on the on-lending of onshore dollar 
deposits in Argentina after the demise of the currency board.   28
ability to intermediate these savings back into the domestic economy without increasing 
financial dollarization.  
 
For IFIs, this would not require expanding credit, transferring resources or incurring 
currency risk. Rather, it would involve issuing local currency bonds and using the 
proceeds to gradually convert current loans into (or refinance maturing loans in) the local 
currency.  Far from a final solution to the dollarization problem, this initiative represents 
a feasible starting point for the much needed development of local currency markets. 
While successful issues of IFI debt in exotic currencies are an encouraging first step, a 
coordinated effort is still needed to convince governments and the IFIs of the benefits of 
using the proceeds to dedollarization multilateral lending.  
 
This paper did not argue that the scheme described above is a sufficient condition to 
reduce FD in emerging economies. Needless to say, the demand for local currency assets 
(and, more generally, the achievement of financial stability) would be contingent on the 
implementation of responsible economic policies consistently over time. However, while 
good policies are by definition a good advice, they are not always sufficient to collect the 
full reward. It is along that margin where the IFIs can make a contribution.    29
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Table 1. Sources of Financial Dollarization 
(non-industrial economies excluding offshore centers; as percent of GDP) 
 





















Mean  0.0825  0.1427 0.0406 0.2238 0.0130 0.4201  0.5027 
Median 0.0625  0.1297 0.0272 0.0872 0.0055 0.3323  0.4326 
Min 0 0.0271  0.0014  0 0  0.09118  0.1185 
Max  0.3390  0.5295 0.2937 2.4379 0.0591 2.6977  2.9492 
1996 
Obs. 30  30 30 30 30 30  30 
Mean  0.1197  0.1286 0.0908 0.1838 0.0183 0.4214  0.5411 
Median 0.0823  0.1207 0.0583 0.0964 0.0028 0.3479  0.4422 
Min 0.0003 0.0359  0.0019  0.0011 0 0.1783  0.1814 
Max 0.5101 0.2484  0.3251  1.973382  0.0987  2.2831  2.7932 
2001 
Obs. 30  30 30 30 30 30  30 
 
Countries in the sample: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Guatemala, Croatia, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and South Africa. 
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Table 2 
Measures of Financial Dollarization – Correlation Matrix 
(non-industrial economies excluding offshore centers; period averages) 
 







liabilities (exc. IFIs) 
IFI lending 
(exc. IMF)  IMF lending  IFI lending /  
Total ext. liabilities 
Deposit offshorization  -0.5754             
 (0.0011)             
  29            
Deposit dollarization  -0.4163  0.6157           
 (0.0540)  (0.0023)           
  22 22          
Dollar external liabilities (exc. IFIs)  0.4209  -0.1966  -0.1390         
 (0.0455)  (0.3687)  (0.5588)         
 23  23  20         
IFI lending (exc. IMF)  -0.2383  0.3060  0.2052  -0.4280       
 (0.2313)  (0.1284)  (0.3722)  (0.0469)       
 27  26  21  22       
IMF lending  -0.2714  0.1701  0.2676  -0.1778  0.2520     
 (0.1709)  (0.4062)  (0.2408)  (0.4285)  (0.2048)     
 27  26  21  22  27     
IFI lending / Total ext. liabilities  -0.1388 0.0674 0.2008  -0.5304  0.7951  0.1568   
 0.4900  0.7437  0.3828  0.0111  0.0000  0.4347   
 27  26  21  22  27  27   
Country risk  -0.5646  0.3678  0.5047 -0.1886  0.5633  0.5073  0.3896 
 (0.0012)  (0.0496)  (0.0166)  (0.3774)  (0.0022)  (0.0069)  (0.0445) 
 30  29  22  24  27  27  27 
 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses. Number of observations in italics. 
Averages computed based on observations for which the country risk index is available. All variables computed over GDP (with the exception of the ratio of IFI  
lending to total external liabilities and the country risk index).   34
Table 3 
Country Risk, Offshorization and Deposit Dollarization 
(non-industrial economies excluding offshore centers) 
 
  Onshore deposits over GDP    Deposit offshorization ratio    Deposit dollarization ratio 
  OLS (period averages)    OLS (period averages)    OLS (period averages)    FE (annual data) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8)
  (9)    (10)
  (11) 
                        
Country risk  -0.030***  -0.039***  -0.031***    0.021***  0.026*  0.020*    0.018*  0.006      0.004**   
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.005)     (0.002)   
                        
Onshore dep. doll. ratio    0.089        -0.020                 
    (0.164)      (0.221)             
                        
Restrictions      0.045       -0.045*            
      (0.047)       (0.023)            
                        
Underlying doll. ratio                   0.426***  0.413***  0.274***       
               (0.089)  (0.066)  (0.054)      
                        
Dep. offshorization ratio                    0.455***  0.334***    0.514***  0.116*** 
                  (0.116)  (0.072)    (0.069)  (0.029) 
                        
Constant  0.560***  0.588***  0.521***  0.272*** 0.240*** 0.298***  0.261***  0.154**  0.303***  0.282*** 0.423*** 
  (0.069)  (0.092)  (0.072)    (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)    (0.054) (0.054) (0.044)    (0.027) (0.078) 
                        
Observations  30  23  24    29 22 26    21 21 78    107  584 
R-squared 0.32  0.39  0.35    0.14  0.20 0.19    0.68 0.83 0.52    0.98 0.96 
 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses                
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
FE regressions include year dummies. 
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Table 4 
Offshorization, IFI lending and IMF lending 
(non-industrial economies excluding offshore centers) 
 
  IFI lending over GDP (exc. IMF)    IMF lending over GDP 
  OLS (averages)  FE (annual data)    OLS (averages)  FE (annual data) 
  (1)
1 (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)
1 (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Deposit offshorization  0.253  0.560***  0.050** 0.147**    0.017  0.036***  0.005**  0.047** 
  (0.161)  (0.141)  (0.025)  (0.060)    (0.020) (0.012) (0.002) (0.024) 
                  
Country risk        0.008***          0.001 
       (0.002)          (0.001) 
                  
Constant 0.094  0.240***  0.504***  0.099***    0.010  0.011**  0.027***  -0.004 
  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.019)  (0.024)    (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.013) 
                  
Observations 26  120  815  125    26  120  816  125 
R-squared  0.09  0.08  0.96  0.98    0.03 0.07 0.92 0.82 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
1 Includes observations for which the country risk index is available. 




Offshorization and liability dollarization 
(non-industrial economies excluding offshore centers) 
 
  Dollar external liabilities  
over GDP (exc. IFIs) 
Total external liabilities 
over GDP (exc. IFIs) 
Liability dollarization ratio 
(exc. IMF)  Liability dollarization ratio 
  OLS (avgs.)  FE (annual)  OLS (avgs.)  FE (annual)  OLS (averages)  OLS (averages) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)
1 (7)  (8)
2 
             
Deposit offshorization  -0.108  0.015 -0.021  0.022  0.154**  0.132***  0.156**  0.131*** 
  (0.099) (0.013)  (0.030) (0.014)  (0.063)  (0.042)  (0.063) (0.034) 
              
Constant  0.260*** 0.165***  0.139*** 0.101***  0.422***  0.467***  0.425*** 0.472*** 
  (0.048) (0.027)  (0.019) (0.009)  (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.034) (0.022) 
             
Observations 23  301  120  815  38 88  38 88 
R-squared  0.04 0.75  0.00 0.84  0.14 0.15  0.14 0.15 
  
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
1 Uses total long-term external debt as a proxy for dollar lon-term external debt. 
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Table 6. 
Pension fund invesments in foreign assets 
(emerging economies with private social security systems) 
 
 










Up to 10% of the Fund’s total asset value.  9.04 
Chile  Up to 20% of the Fund’s asset value.  23.89 
Mexico 
Although the SIEFORES Law determines that total investment in 
instruments denominated in foreign currencies (U.S. Dollars, Euros, 
Yens) must not exceed the 10% of the Fund´s total asset value, no 





As regards compulsory pensions, up to 10% of the Fund’s total value 
can be invested in foreign assets (rule effective since September 1st 
2001). On the other hand, no quantitative limits have been set for 
voluntary pensions, although the law requires that the issuer be 
awarded the "investment grade" status by credit rating agencies. 
7.36 




No less than 10% or greater than 50% of the Fund´s asset value.  n.a. 
(*) Amongst others, it includes assets issued or backed by foreign governments and central banks or commercial banks (both 
foreign and international), stocks and corporate bonds, mutual funds and foreign stock indices.  
(**) Obtained as the ratio of funds invested in foreign assets to total fund’s portfolio value at December 2003. For Peru, the last 
available data belongs to August 2003. 










Pension fund stocks and flows, offshore deposits and IFI lending 
(emerging economies with private social security systems) 
 
  Pension fund 
(2003) 
    










LATAM                 
ARGENTINA 1994  956  15,947    23,413    21,211    15,466 
BOLIVIA 1997  192  1,485    1,176    3,103    278 
COLOMBIA 1994  775  7,326    7,252    8,591    - 
COSTA RICA  2001  167  304    3,234    1,654    - 
CHILE 1981  6,206  49,691    13,242    1,751    - 
EL SALVADOR  1998  476  1,572    1,006    2,563    - 
MÉXICO 1997  6,765  35,844    48,616    19,852    - 
PERU 1993  754  6,341    5,894    14,688    139 
DOMINICAN REP.  2003  34  34    2,391    2,447    130 
URUGUAY 1996  112  1,232    7,500    2,302    2,407 
EUROPE / ASIA                 
BULGARIA 2000  13  134    2,965    N.A.    1,183 
KAZAJSTAN 1998  N.A.  2,631    1,383    2,148    - 
POLONIA 2000  2,822  11,058    19,378    17,810    - 
TOTAL    19,272 133,602    137,450    98,120   19,602 
 
Source: FIAP, national pensions supervisory agencies, national pension funds unions, BIS, IMF and GDF (World Bank). Gross inflows for Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Dominican Republic and Bulgaria obtained as the difference between the stock of assets for 2003 and 2002 (both informed by FIAP).   39
Appendix I 
 
Variable sources and definitions 
  Onshore dollar (peso) deposits: Foreign (local) currency deposits with domestic banks. Source: Levy 
Yeyati (2004).  
  Onshore deposits: Onshore dollar deposits + Onshore peso deposits. 
  Offshore deposits: Cross-border deposits by residents with banks domiciled in BIS reporting countries. 
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
  Total deposits: Offshore deposits + Onshore deposits.  
  Deposit offshorization ratio:  Offshore deposits / Total deposits. 
  Deposit dollarization ratio: (Onshore dollar deposits + offshore deposits) / Total deposits. 
  Onshore deposit dollarization ratio: Onshore dollar deposits / Onshore deposits. 
  External loans: Cross-border loans to residents from banks domiciled in BIS reporting countries. 
Source: BIS. 
  Dollar (peso) bonded external debt: Private and public external bonds denominated in foreign (local) 
currency; stocks outstanding. Source: BIS. 
  IFI lending: Long-term debt with official creditors. Public and publicly guaranteed debt from official 
creditors includes loans from international organizations (multilateral loans) and loans from governments 
(bilateral loans). Source: Global Development Finance 2003 (GDF 2003). Units: US dollars. Scale: 
millions. 
  IMF lending: Use of IMF credit. Denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF with respect to all uses of 
IMF resources, excluding those resulting from drawings in the reserve tranche. Source: GDF.  
  Dollar external liabilities: External loans + Dollar bonded external debt + IFI lending. 
  Total external debt: Includes public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private nonguaranteed 
long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and estimated short-term debt outstanding. Source: GDF. 
  Short-term external debt: Defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Source: 
GDF. 
  Total long-term external debt: Total external debt minus short-term external debt. Used in some tests as 
an alternative measure of dollar external liabilities. Source: GDF.   40
  Liability dollarization ratio: (Dollar external liabilities + Dollar onshore deposits)/(Dollar external 
liabilities + Peso bonded debt + onshore deposits). The currency composition of deposits is used to proxy 
the currency composition of domestic loans. 
   Country risk: J.P. Morgan Bond EMBI Global index. Included in the EMBI Global are US dollar 
denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local market debt instruments issued by 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. Source: J.P. Morgan. 
  Restrictions: Index of restrictiveness of rules on resident holdings of foreign currency deposits onshore 
as of beginning of 2001. Source: Levy Yeyati (2004) based on IMF, 2001 Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, following the methodology proposed by De Nicoló et al. 
(2003).  
  Underlying Dollarization Ratio:  (Var(π) – Cov (π,s)) / (Var (π) + Var(s) – 2Cov (π,s)),  where π and s 
are the monthly inflation and real devaluation rates. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS).   41
Deposit dollarization data: Countries and periods covered 
Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. Country  Dollariz. 
Albania 1992-2001  Ecuador* 1990-1999 Lebanon 1993-2001  Sierra  Leone  1993-1999
Angola 1995-2001  Egypt  1980-2001 Lithuania** 1993-2001  Slovak  Republic**  1993-2001
Antigua and Barbuda* 1979-2001  El Salvador*  1982-2001 Macedonia, FYR**  1997-2001  Slovenia**  1991-2001
Argentina*  1981-2001 Estonia**  1991-2001 Malawi  1994-2001 South  Africa  1991-2001
Armenia** 1992-2001  Ethiopia  1998-1999 Malaysia 1996-2001  Spain  1996-2001
Austria 1997-2001  Finland  1996-2001 Maldives  1981-1999  St. Kitts and Nevis*  1979-2001
Azerbaijan**  1992-2001 Georgia**  1992-2001 Malta  1975-1984 St.  Lucia*  1979-1999
Bahamas, The  1975-2001  Ghana  1995-2000 Mauritius  1992-1999  St. Vincent & Grens.*1979-2001
Bangladesh  1987-2001 Greece  1990-2001 Mexico*  1991-2002 Sudan  1992-1998
Bahrain  1984-1997 Grenada*  1979-1999 Moldova**  1994-2001 Suriname*  1975 
Barbados*  1975-2001 Guatemala*  1995-2002 Mongolia**  1992-2001 Sweden  1994-2001
Belarus**  1992-2001 Guinea  1989-2001 Mozambique  1991-2001 Switzerland  1998-2001
Belize  1976-2001 Guinea-Bissau  1990-1996 Myanmar  1991-1999 Syrian  Arab  Republic 1975-1998
Bhutan  1993-2001 Haiti*  1994-2001 Netherlands  1990-2001 Tajikistan*  1996-2000
Bolivia*  1975-2001 Honduras*  1990-2001 Netherlands  Antilles* 1975-2001 Tanzania  1993-2001
Bosnia and Herzeg.** 1996-2001  Hong Kong  1991-2001 New Zealand  1990-2001  Thailand  1982-2001
Bulgaria**  1991-2001 Hungary**  1989-2001 Nicaragua*  1990-2001 Trinidad  and  Tobago 1993-2001
Cape  Verde  1995-1999 Iceland  1978-1999 Nigeria  1994-2001 Turkey  1986-2001
Cambodia  1993-2001 Indonesia  1992-2001 Norway  1996-2000 Turkmenistan**  1993-2000
Chile*  1976-2001 Israel  1981-2001 Oman  1975-1999 Tonga  1994-1999
China,P.R.: Mainland  1998-2001  Italy  1996-2000 Pakistan 1990-1998  Uzbekistan  1997-1999
Colombia* 1990-1999  Jamaica*  1992-2001 Papua New Guinea  1976-1999  Uganda  1992-2000
Comoros  1998-2001 Japan  1996-2001 Paraguay*  1988-2001 Ukraine**  1992-2001
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1975-2001  Jordan  1990-1999 Peru*  1975-2001  United Arab Emirates 1981-2001
Costa  Rica*  1990-2002 Kazakhstan**  1998-2001 Philippines  1982-2001 United  Kingdom  1990-2001
Croatia**  1993-2001 Kenya  1995-2001 Poland**  1985-2001 Uruguay*  1981-2001
Czech  Republic**  1993-2001 Korea  1990-2001 Qatar  1993-1999 Vanuatu  1981-1999
Cyprus  1991-1999 Kuwait  1981-1999 Romania**  1990-2001 Venezuela*  1994-2001
Denmark 1991-2001  Kyrgyz  Republic**  1995-2001 Russia** 1993-2001  Vietnam  1992-2001
Dominica*  1988-2001  Lao People's Dem. Rep.1989-2001 Rwanda 1994-1999  Yemen  1990-2001
Dominican Republic  1996-2001  Latvia**  1992-2001 Sao Tome & Principe 1995-2001  Zambia  1994-2001
      Saudi  Arabia  1975-2001  Zimbabwe 1993-1999
  Note: (*) denotes Latin American countries and (**) denotes Transition countries.   42
Emerging Market Bond Index Global: Countries and periods covered 
 
Country Period  covered    Country Period  covered 
Algeria 1999-2003    Malaysia  1996-2003 
Argentina* 1993-2003    Nigeria  1993-2003 
Bulgaria** 1994-2003    Pakistan  2001-2003 
Brazil* 1994-2003    Panama*  1996-2003 
Chile* 1999-2003   Peru* 1997-2003 
China: Mainland  1994-2003    Philippines  1997-2003 
Cote D’Ivoire  1998-2003    Poland  1994-2003 
Colombia* 1997-2003    Russia**  1997-2003 
Croatia** 1996-2003    El  Salvador*  2002-2003 
Dominican Republic*  2001-2003    Thailand  1997-2003 
Ecuador* 1995-2003    Tunisia  2002-2003 
Egypt 2001-2003   Ukraine  2000-2003 
Hungary 1999-2003    Turkey  1996-2003 
Korea 1993-2003   Uruguay*  2001-2003 
Lebanon 1995-2003    Venezuela*  1993-2003 
Morocco 1997-2003    South  Africa  1994-2003 
México* 1993-2003       





















First note that, from (1), 
 
CH H F CF r= r r r θ − ++  (A.1)   
which implies that 
  () ( )( )()0
CH H F CF Er Er Er Er θ  =−− + =   (A.2) 
to rule out arbitrage between a portfolio 
F
H CF x xx −+  and  CH x . 
Then, using  1
HFC FC H xxx x ++ + =  and 
CH H F CF r= r r r − + , we obtain 
() ( ) ( ) ()
FC H FH C FC H C FH H r xxr r xxrr r =− −+ + −+ , so that the investor’s problem can 
now be written as: 
 
{} ,
max ( ) ( )
2 FC H C FC H xx x x
c
UE r V a r r
−+
=−  (A.3) 
s.t. , , , 0 F H CF CH xxx x ≥  
where 
 () ( )
H Er Er ′ =+ xw  (A.4) 
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Interest rate arbitrage by risk-neutral borrowers implies that 
 
  () ( ) ( ) .
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 (A.8) 
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Binding offshorization and liability dollarization 
 















  In turn, noting that, combining (9) and (A.8), 
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If the previous condition is satisfied,  0
F x =  in equilibrium. Thus, in the absence of 
foreign peso assets, the investor’s problem can now be written as: 
 
{}
max ( ) ( )
2 HF xx
c
UE r V a r r
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CF rx r r r = −+  
 
from which the first and second moments of the probability distribution of portfolio real 
returns can be expressed as 
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so that the additional dollarization induced by offshorization in the absence of a country 
risk-free peso assets is increasing in country risk 
 













 ++  =− − +×
 ++   ,  (A.11) 
 


































Positive correlation between exchange rate risk and country risk 
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Thus, offshorization now becomes binding (λ γ < ) iff 
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increases with  cs ρ . 
 